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With the Missouri Supreme Court's 1987 decision of Hanson v. Hanson,
Missouri joined other states that have considered the difficult issues surround-
ing the asset of goodwill in a marital dissolution proceeding to which a profes-
sional is a party.2 The Hanson court faced and resolved issues of divorce and
the division of a professional's marital property more firmly than had previous
courts.3 The Missouri Supreme Court held that goodwill in a professional
practice is property subject to division in a dissolution, and it considered issues
relating to proving the existence and value of such goodwill.4
1. 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
2. See generally Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (1981); Todd v.
Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969); Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal.
App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1969); Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301
P.2d 90 (1956); In re Marriage of Nichols, 606 P.2d 1314 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); In re
Marriage of White, 98 Ill. App. 3d 380, 424 N.E.2d 421 (1981); Powell v. Powell, 231
Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982); Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984);
Brandis v. Brandis, 489 A.2d 1110 (Me. 1985); In re Marriage of Hull, - Mont.
-, 712 P.2d 1317 (1986); Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721, 386 N.W.2d 851 (1986);
Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); Weaver v. Weaver, 72 N.C. App.
409, 324 S.E.2d 915 (1985); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972); In re Marriage
of Fleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d
327, 309 N.W.2d 343 (1981).
3. For example, Missouri appellate courts have been faced several times with the
issue of whether a spouse's graduate or professional degree is marital property under
Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330 (1986). Missouri has stopped short of expressly classifying
degrees as marital property in the familiar situation of when one spouse puts the other
through graduate or professional school; instead, the law in Missouri is that courts may
consider contributions made by one spouse toward the other's professional education in
balancing the interests of each spouse. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982); Lowrey v. Lowrey, 633 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); In re Mar-
riage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Similarly, in the Hanson opin-
ion, the supreme court reemphasized that future earning capacity is not marital prop-
erty in Missouri. 738 S.W.2d at 435. In general, it appears that courts are more willing
to declare that goodwill is marital property despite the attendant problems with valua-
tion. H. FOSTER & R. BROWN, CONTEMPORARY MATRIMONIAL LAW ISSUES: A GUIDE
TO DIVORCE ECONOMICS & PRACTICE 230 (1985); Krauskopf, Marital Property at
Marriage Dissolution, 42 Mo. L. REV. 157, 169 (1978).
4. 738 S.W.2d at 439. This case was one of first impression in Missouri. Id.
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Richard Graham and Jonathan Hanson, both oral surgeons, formed a
partnership in 1973 in Jefferson City, Missouri." Dr. Hanson married in 1974
after completing his education. Mrs. Hanson had obtained a nursing degree
and during the marriage earned a master's degree in nursing.' The Grahams
were married in 1969, four years before the partnership was launched, and Dr.
Graham completed his education during the marriage.'
Both couples found it necessary to initiate dissolution proceedings; the
Hanson dissolution was tried in Boone County and the Graham case in Cole
County.8 Mrs. Hanson and Mrs. Graham employed the same accountant to
testify as an expert with regard to the value of the oral surgery partnership.9
The husbands relied on expert testimony from another accountant. The results
of the experts were not uniform; the wives' expert testified that the partner-
ship's total value was $442,212.00, but the husbands' expert arrived at a total
value of only $91,000.00.10 In addition, Dr. Hanson employed an oral surgeon
from Columbia, Missouri, who testified that when he purchased an interest in
a similar partnership he paid nothing for goodwill or going concern value."1
Finally, both Drs. Graham and Hanson introduced their partnership agree-
ment, which dictated that goodwill was not to be a component of a partner's
interest.
12
The trial courts reached disparate results. The Circuit Court of Boone
County valued the partnership at $324,862.00,13 but the Circuit Court of Cole
County valued Dr. Graham's interest in the partnership at only $45,140.00.1,
After appeals, the Missouri Supreme Court granted transfer and consolidated
the cases.'
The supreme court's opinion had several components: it defined goodwill
for the purposes of dividing it in a dissolution,' 6 it gave guidance regarding the
methods that should be used to prove that goodwill exists in a professional
5. Id. at 431.
6. Id. at 432.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 431.
10. Id. The expert for the wives attributed a value of $39,750.00 to equipment,
$51,385.00 to accounts receivable and $351,077.00 to "going concern value." The hus-
bands' expert, however, determined that no goodwill or going concern value existed
after comparing the subject partnership with similar partnerships in the area.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 431-32.
13. Id. at 432. This total consisted of $39,750.00 for equipment, $51,385.00 for
accounts receivable and $233,727.00 for the partnership's ordinary income for the pre-
ceding year. The trial court used the partnership agreement in arriving at the result.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 430-31.
16. Id. at 433-37. In a somewhat unorganized fashion, the court attempted to
spell out what is and what is not included in the Missouri definition of goodwill. See
infra notes 19-55 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53
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practice17 and it sorted through several ways in which to value goodwill. I8 This
Note will analyze the court's opinion so as to arrive at a definition of Mis-
souri's view of goodwill in similar cases, discuss the methods that were ap-
proved or rejected for proving the existence and value of goodwill, and ex-
amine related issues and trends in this area.
MISSOURI'S CALCULUS OF GOODWILL
The Hanson court, like courts and commentators elsewhere, struggled in
its search for a definition of goodwill and the parameters of the concept of
goodwill." The court went from quoting the venerable English case of
Cruttwell v. Lye2" to citing accounting texts. 2' While the court considered
three familar definitons, it did not adopt any succinct description of goodwill. 22
A general understanding of goodwill can be had through the following
familiar definition:
Goodwill may be properly enough described to be the advantage or bene-
fit which is acquired by an establishment beyond the mere value of the capi-
tal, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the general
public patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or habit-
ual customers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or repu-
tation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circum-
stances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.2
Any concept of goodwill in the professional context, then, must include the
notion that it is something beyond the value of the tangible, identifiable assets
of a business. 24
The view of goodwill from a legal standpoint has not developed uniformly
17. Id. at 435. See infra text accompanying notes 56-57.
18. Id. at 435-37. The court mentioned five valuation methods, expressed a
"strong preference" for one and rejected a variety of other methods utilizing account-
ing principles. Id. at 436. See infra notes 58-82 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 16.
20. 7 Ves. 335, 34 Eng. Rep. 129 (Ch. 1810).
21. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 433.
22. Id. The court noted that a "common theme in all of these definitions is that
the goodwill which can be sold, and is therefore property, attaches not to an individual
but to a business entity." Id. This proposition is discussed infra notes 27-29 and accom-
panying text.
23. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 84 (1968).
24. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 433. This Note will not carry on an extended discus-
sion of the various points of view regarding goodwill's exact nature. For such discus-
sions, see Adams, Is Professional Goodwill Divisible Community Property?, 6 COMMU-
NITY PROP. J. 61 (1973); Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Marital Dissolution: Is it
Property or Another Name for Alimony?, 52 CAL. ST. B.J. 27 (1977); Comment, Valu-
ation of Professional Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolution, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 186
(1975). Instead, the only definition with which this Note is concerned will be that of
Missouri as enunciated in Hanson, along with the attendant problems.
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with accounting and economic views.25 One commentator has argued that it is
accountants and economists who have shaped the concept of goodwill and un-
derstand it best; judges, however, when faced with issues pertaining to good-
will have tended to distort the concept.26 The main flaw in the legal concept is
that courts have often failed to distinguish between individual and business
earnings. 27 More specifically, goodwill has been erroneously identified with the
reputation of the individual.28 Missouri's treatment of goodwill in Hanson and
its sister case, however, began correctly as the supreme court declared that
"the reputation and skill of an individual entrepreneur - be he a professional
or a traditional businessman - is not a component of the intangible asset we
identify as goodwill." 29
Missouri law after Hanson also dictates that, in dissolution proceedings,
goodwill is to be synonymous with the concept of going concern value.30 Going
concern value certainly has characteristics similar to those of goodwill, but in
a strict accounting sense the two are distinct.3' The United States Supreme
Court described going concern value as "an element of value in an assembled
and established plant, doing business and earning money, over one not thus
advanced. 312 The going concern element, then, refers to the amount by which
the total value of a business entity exceeds the value of the separate items of
property; the excess value is a result of the fact that the assets already have
been combined into the form of a business.
Courts often have failed to distinguish goodwill from going concern value
when such a distinction is needed. 3 The Hanson court cited two cases support-
ing the courts' traditional treatment of goodwill and going concern value as
the same in dissolution proceedings.3 4 Whether courts have done this unknow-
25. See Parkman, The Treatment of Professional Goodwill in Divorce Proceed-
ings, 18 FAm. L.Q. 213 (1984).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 215.
28. Id. Fortunately, the Hanson court took steps to avoid making this common
mistake. 738 S.W.2d at 433. See supra note 22.
29. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 434. The court noted that its view is "consistent with
and no broader than the economic, accounting and legal definition" which has devel-
oped. Id. Insofar as considerations of reputation are concerned, the court is correct.
30. Id. at 437.
31. Comment, Valuation of Professional Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolution, 7
Sw. U.L. REv. 186, 187 n.6 (1975).
32. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287, 313
(1933) (quoting Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165
(1915)); see also City of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 191-92
(1918). Los Angeles Gas & Electric is a good example of an instance in which goodwill
was expressly not held to be synonymous with going concern value. The case dealt with
the issue of whether rates for public service corporations were confiscatory. The Han-
son court, in contrast, held that goodwill and going concern value were the same in
dissolution proceedings. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
33. Cf. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 470 F.2d 1107, 1108-09 (8th
Cir. 1973)(warning against such confusion of the two principles).
34. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 437. The court cited In re Marriage of Hall, 103
[Vol. 53
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ingly or with purpose, the approach probably is acceptable even though the
concepts differ from an accounting point of view. 35 Where a professional prac-
tice is involved the difference between the two concepts is less important, 6 and
therefore Missouri is in line with most other states in treating goodwill and
going concern value as equivalents in dissolution proceedings.
The Hanson court devoted only a paragraph to the issue of future earning
capacity, holding that goodwill is not to be confused with future earning ca-
pacity.37 This separation is especially appropriate in Missouri, where courts
never have held that future earning potential is marital property.38 Further, it
is consistent with the majority of American jurisdictions.3 9
Cases in other states such as California have rejected the equation of
goodwill and future earning potential. In re Marriage of Aufmuth40 rejected
such an argument, as did In re Marriage of Lopez.41 The Lopez court summa-
rized its position: "We think ... that in marital cases the expectancy of future
earnings is not synonymous with, nor should it be the basis for, determining
the value of 'goodwill' of a professional practice, but is simply a factor to
consider in deciding if such an asset exists. 42 If Missouri follows this reason-
ing, it is clear that future earning capacity has no place in the goodwill equa-
tion in Missouri.
The Hanson court criticized cases which treated professional goodwill at
dissolution but failed to distinguish the individual professional's reputation
from the business entity's reputation. 43 Here again, although the Missouri Su-
preme Court took care to avoid other courts' mistakes, the court's analysis on
the point is susceptible to the criticism that it is superficial.
Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984) (en banc), and In re Marriage of Hull,
Mont. -, 712 P.2d 1317 (1986).
35. Accounting texts may distinguish goodwill and going concern value by giving
goodwill a less expansive understanding. Goodwill is only a part of going concern value
because goodwill is only the amount actually paid that is more than a firm's specific
assets when another company is purchased. See A. DREBIN, Other Intangibles, in
HANDBOOK OF MODERN ACCOUNTING 22-15 (1977).
36. See Comment, Valuation of Professional Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolu-
tion, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 186, 187 n.6 (1975).
37. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 435; see supra note 3.
38. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 435.
39. Comment, Identifying, Valuing and Dividing Professional Goodwill as Com-
munity Property at Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 TUL. L. REv. 313, 323
(1981).
40. 9 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979).
41. 8 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974).
42. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 108-109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68. Other factors mentioned by
the court were "the practitioner's age, health, past demonstrated earning power, profes-
sional reputation in the community as to his judgment, skill, knowledge, his compara-
tive professional success, and the nature and duration of his business. . . ." Id., 113 Cal.
Rptr. at 68. The Hanson court discussed these factors in view of the professional's
reputation. See infra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
43. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 433.
1988)
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The court criticized Dugan v. Dugan,4" which held that "reputation is at
the core" of professional goodwill. 45 One critic of Dugan and other cases which
confuse individual reputation with goodwill argued that the cases are "placing
a value on an individual's reputation, which is something possessed by every-
one."'46 Similarly, the court criticized In re Marriage of Fleege47 for having
the same defects as Dugan.
48
After citing Dugan and Fleege as examples of cases which incorrectly
take reputation into account, the supreme court cited with approval three
cases which view goodwill "independently of the individual professional's repu-
tation. '49 Taylor v. Taylor5" contains a particularly lucid discussion of the
reputation facet of goodwill. In that case, goodwill is considered a distinct bus-
iness asset and as such has a readily determinable value as part of a commer-
cial or business entity. If the asset depends on the presence of an individual,
however, it obviously and by definition cannot be an asset distinct from the
individual.5 1 Hanson was consistent with Taylor in holding that goodwill "is
the result of the tendency of clients/patients to return to and to recommend
the practice irrespective of the reputation of the individual practitioner.'5 2
Finally, Hanson held that goodwill in Missouri is not affected by the size
or organization of a professional practice.5 3 Professional goodwill obviously
may exist in either a solo practice or a very large firm, but the problem often
is proving its existence.
The definition of goodwill in a professional practice proffered by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court includes "the value of the practice which exceeds its
tangible assets and which is the result of the tendency of clients/patients to
return to and recommend the practice irrespective of the reputation of the
44. 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983).
45. Id. at -, 457 A.2d at 6.
46. Parkman, The Treatment of Professional Goodwill in Divorce Proceedings,
18 FAM. L.Q. 213, 219 (1984).
47. 1 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979) (en banc).
48. Fleege listed the almost identical factors that Lopez did. See supra note 42.
The Hanson court disapproved of these factors with these words: "Each of these factors
is, in our view, directly attributable to the professional as a person. For this reason, we
find that the Fleege analysis is mired in the same mixture of personal reputation and
entity reputation as is found in Dugan." 738 S.W.2d at 434.
49. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 434. Based on what the court said about Dugan and
Fleege, it appears that the court liked what was said in Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721,
386 N.W.2d 851 (1986); Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa. Super. 20, 518 A.2d 545 (1986);
and Geesbreght-v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
50. 22 Neb. 721, 386 N.W.2d 851 (1986).
51. Id. at 731, 386 N.W.2d at 858.
52. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 434 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 435. The court said that it is more likely that goodwill will exist in
large firms "because reliance by patients/clients on the reputation and skill of the indi-
vidual practitioner is, in most cases, inversely related to the number of practitioners in
the practice." Id. No authority was offered for this assertion.
[Vol. 53
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individual practitioner."5 4 A complete description of goodwill in Missouri -
complete at least as far as Hanson is concerned -would state that the concept
may attach only to a business entity, does not depend on the organization or
size of a firm, is generally synonymous with a firm's going concern value. It is
not linked to a professional's future earning capacity or reputation as an
individual. 55
PROVING THE EXISTENCE OF GOODWILL
Hanson devoted only one paragraph to the problem of proof of goodwill's
existence. The court's reason for this lack of discussion is that it was con-
cerned that certain valuation methods may confuse value and proof.56 In his
discussion of proof Judge Robertson again referred to the complexities sur-
rounding reputation.
If nothing else, by saving space in its discussion of proof, the court
strengthened its clarity. Everything the practitioner needs to know about prov-
ing the existence of goodwill in a professional context in Missouri (at least
immediately after Hanson) was contained in two sentences:
Because of the difficulties inherent in separating the reputation of the
professional from that of his enterprise, evidence that other professionals are
willing to pay for goodwill when acquiring a practice is, in our view, the only
acceptable evidence of the existence of goodwill. Thus, as a matter of proof,
the existence of goodwill is shown only when there is evidence of a recent
actual sale of a similarly situated professional practice, an offer to purchase
such a practice, or expert testimony and testimony of members of the subject
profession as to the existence of goodwill in a similar practice in the relevant
geographic and professional market.57
Because of the definiteness with which this statement was made, Hanson offers
a clear guide to the practitioner regarding the method of proof. At the same
time, however, it offers flexibility in that a party may use expert testimony,
recent sales and offers to purchase to prove goodwill valuation.
VALUATION
The problem of valuing goodwill probably has been the foremost hurdle
with which courts have had to deal.58 The Hanson court outlined five formulas
54. Id. at 434.
55. As indicated in note 2, supra, no fewer than fourteen states have dealt with
the issue in Hanson. On the issue of defining goodwill, the court seemed to express a
preference for three cases from other jurisdictions. See supra note 49. Therefore, it
may be wise for anyone dealing with this aspect of goodwill in Missouri to read those
cases in conjunction with Hanson.
56. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 435.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. See Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Professional Goodwill as
Community Property at Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 TUL. L. REv. 313,
19881
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which are most often used in the valuation stage. In so doing, it stated a pref-
erence for one and rejected another widely used formula. 59
The method of valuation to be used in Missouri, according to Hanson, is
the fair market value approach, under which goodwill's value is set by the sale
price of the practice in the market.60 The court offered three reasons for its
preferential treatment of this method. First, it does not consider future earning
capacity. Second, it is the most accurate measure. Third, it does not require
the professional to pay his former spouse a sum that is not a result of a realis-
tic valuation. 61
Fair market value, of course, is the value assigned to an asset by a buyer
and seller, both of whom are willing parties in the transaction and have full
knowledge of the facts.6 2 Therefore, to be useful, the approach would seem to
require a sale of the asset. This probably is the most serious flaw in applying
the fair market value method, since the sale of a practice rarely coincides with
the parties' divorce. In many cases the problem of lack of a sale is ignored,
and instead the fair market value essentially is estimated using expert testi-
mony. In addition, prices in similar sales can be used to estimate the value of a
practice's goodwill.63 The use of these alternatives to a sale are not entirely
consistent with a fair market value approach, however, because that method,
in its true form, necessitates a sale.
Although the court expressed a preference for the fair market value ap-
proach, it gave very little guidance on the crucial question of how fair market
value will be determined under less than ideal circumstances. The fair market
value approach is fraught with difficulties, uncertainties and imprecision, but
the court's off-hand treatment belies these facts. A business comparable to the
one being valued will be very difficult to find. Expert testimony will present
additional problems. What, for example, will the experts examine in order to
prepare their testimony? As was the case in Hanson, trial courts almost al-
ways will be confronted with the task of choosing between the testimony of
opposing experts. These concerns and unanswered questions were not ade-
quately addressed in the opinion.
The problem of lack of a sale price sometimes can be overcome by using
other means to set a fair market value. Hanson declared that a buy-sell agree-
ment could be used under "certain circumstances. '64 A buy-sell agreement
can meet the requirements of a test for determining fair market value if a
330-31 (1981).
59. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 435-36.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 436.
62. Comment, Professional Goodwill in Louisiana: An Analysis of its Classifi-
cation, Valuation, and Partition, 43 LA. L. REV. 119, 142 (1982).
63. Id. at 142.
64. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 436. See also Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d
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willing buyer and seller are involved.6 5 The parties to a partnership frequently
determine at the outset the respective values of their interests in the entity,
and this established value can be used for several purposes, including valuation
upon the sale by a partner of his interest or valuation upon the death of a
partner. The buy-sell agreement would seem to represent an indication of what
the business is worth from the partners' viewpoints.
Hanson dictates that a buy-sell agreement may be used on the issue of
goodwill valuation when the trial court finds that it is proper." Using a buy-
sell agreement, however, is subject to a good deal of criticism. The value of a
partner's interest which is set out in a buy-sell agreement, for example, may
not represent goodwill value or it may not constitute an accurate measure.
Still, the fair market value method seems to be a popular approach
among many courts.17 Despite the approach's shortcomings, the Missouri prac-
titioner should become familiar with it and, in view of Hanson, should use it
whenever possible. Even with its uncertainties and disadvantages,68 the fair
market value method has been used in states such as Texas, 69 Colorado7 0 and
it is very popular and frequently used in California. 1 Finally, the Internal
Revenue Service seems to favor the approach over the other commonly used
methods.
7 2
65. This discussion will view a buy-sell agreement as one way that can be used to
determine goodwill's fair market value. It should be noted that Hanson used as an
example of a buy-sell agreement "the value established in a partnership agreement..
• ." Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 436. However, the parties to a buy-sell agreement are not
necessarily (or often even remotely) considering fair market value of business assets
when drafting the agreement. Ordinarily, neither party will know who will be buying
and who will be selling, and, therefore, the parties have an incentive to arrive at only a
"fair" price. Even so, the price determined may not necessarily be appropriate in a
dissolution situation. In short, a buy-sell agreement ordinarily is not formulated to pro-
vide a value for assets in the event a partner subsequently goes through a divorce.
Relying on such an agreement in such circumstances, therefore, contains hazards if the
goal is to arrive at market value.
66. Id.
67. See Comment, supra note 62, at 142. The word "preferred" is not defined in
the comment. It is not explained whether the fair market value approach is simply the
most popular or whether courts believe it is the most accurate gauge. Id. To the extent
that an accurate fair market value can be determined, few would quarrel that the
method should be used. However, it is not often that an accurate market value can be
determined. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
68. See id. at 143-44. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
69. Geesbreght v. Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
70. In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314 (1979).
71. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr.
668 (1979); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974); In
re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1974); In re Marriage
of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973).
72. Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327, 328 states that other approaches "may
be used for determining the fair market value of intangible assets of a business only if
there is no better basis therefor available."
1988]
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Three other methods commonly used on the valuation issue, all of which
are complex accounting formulas, were rejected in Hanson because they
"draw no distinction between the future earning capacity of the individual and
that of the entity in which he or she practices.""7 This apparently ill-thought-
out pronouncement by the Hanson court is the most troubling aspect of the
opinion. Although the practitioner obviously should concentrate on the fair
market value and buy-sell agreement approaches outlined above, the methods
which were rejected merit some attention, if for no other reason than to see
what Missouri is missing.
Under a straight capitalization method, the professional's average net
profits are determined, and this figure is then capitalized using a definite
rate.74 The result yields what is the total value of the business; to determine
goodwill, the business's book value is subtracted from the total value." Some
judges and commentators - like the Missouri Supreme Court - have not
endorsed the straight capitalization method because, they say, it is arbitrary70
and fails to consider the professional's excess earnings.77
Finally, the court rejected the capitalization of excess earnings method.78
There are two recognized variations of this method. In one, the average practi-
tioner's salary is deducted from the average net income of the practice and the
difference is capitalized to determine goodwill.79 The IRS variant requires a
valuation of the net tangible assets and then a determination of the value of
goodwill by capitalizing any excess earnings over a reasonable return on the
net assets.80
73. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 436. The disapproved methods were the straight cap-
italization method, the capitalization of excess earnings method and the Internal Reve-
nue Service variation of capitalized excess earnings.
74. Id. at 435; In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 243-44, 692 P.2d 175,
179 (1984) (en bane). The capitalization rate represents the percentage of return on
capital which will be attractive to investors. See 5 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 505, 515
(1960), which contains a standard approach to proving the value of goodwill.
75. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 435. For illustrations of this method, see In re Mar-
riage of Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 244, 692 P.2d 175, 179 (1984) (en bane); G.
WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH & W. HARRISON, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 521 (5th ed.
1979).
76. See Comment, Valuation of Professional Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolu-
tion, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 186, 194 (1975).
77. G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH & W. HARRISON, supra note 75, at 521; see
also Levy v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 547, 397 A.2d 374, 376 (1978).
78. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 436.
79. Id. at 435.
80. Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327. Following this formula, the following
steps could be used to value the goodwill of a business:
1. Determine the average earnings of the business for a representative num-
ber of years immediately preceding the date on which valuation occurs. Earn-
ings should be based on at least the last five years, disregarding years with
abnormally high or low earnings.
2. Arrive at the average annual value of the tangible assets of the business
for a representative number of years before the valuation date.
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PROFESSIONAL GOODWILL
In rejecting these accounting formulas the Hanson court made its most
harmful error. The court explained that its rationale for rejecting capitaliza-
tion formulas was their consideration of future earning capacity.81 An analysis
of greater scrutiny than that of the court proves this claim inaccurate.
All of the factors which go into the formula - the business's average net
income and the business's average net tangible assets - involve past earnings
or assets data. In other words, past earnings and assets are used to determine
current goodwill. The postmarital experiences of the professional spouse are
not considered because the goodwill that was generated during the marriage
exists at time of dissolution."2 The capitalization formulas, therefore, do not
necessarily present the problem which distressed the Hanson court.
INITIAL REACTIONS TO AND APPLICATION OF Hanson
In Taylor v. Taylor, 3 which was decided the same day as Hanson, the
Missouri Supreme Court made it very clear that it meant what it had said in
Hanson. In Taylor, Patricia Taylor had been trained as a chiropractor during
the marriage and had founded the Taylor Chiropractic Center. 4 At trial,
David Taylor employed an expert to place a value on the chiropractic prac-
tice.85 The expert arrived at a total value of $280,978.00, which included
$121,334.00 attributable to goodwill.86 In arriving at the value of the prac-
tice's goodwill, however, the expert capitalized the average adjusted annual
net income of the practice.8 7
Both the trial court and the supreme court held that there was no evi-
3. Determine a "fair percentage return" (usually the industry average) on
the tangible assets determined in 2.
4. Deduct 3 from 1, which yields the amount of average earnings attributa-
ble to goodwill.
5. Capitalize the amount resulting from 4 at a proper percentage (usually
about 20%). This results in the fair market value of the goodwill.
21 Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) P-6517 to P-6522 (1988).
81. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 436. The court said: "The very purpose of capitaliza-
tion formulae is to place a present value on the future earnings of the business entity
being valued."
82. See generally Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo.
L. REV. 157, 170 (1978) ("It seems that the only valuation methods that do not utilize
evidence of individual future prospects are those applying a capitalization multiple de-
rived either from the I.R.S., from retirement or buy-sell agreements, or from guidelines
in the industry or profession.") Other courts have shared the same fear concerning
future earnings which was expressed by the Hanson court. In re Marriage of Foster, 42
Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974), for example, approved two
of the accounting methods rejected in Hanson because they do measure goodwill by
looking at the past.
83. 736 S.W.2d 388 (Mo. 1987) (en banc).
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dence that the chiropractic practice had any goodwill element. The husband in
Taylor failed to produce evidence of the fair market value of any goodwill.
Nor did he present evidence of the sales prices or offers on similar practices in
the same area. 8 As a consequence and example of an application of Hanson,
the husband did not prove that the professional practice involved had any
goodwill value.
In re Marriage of Brooks89 provided an interpretation of Hanson (which,
of course, concerned only goodwill in the professional context) and the treat-
ment of commercial goodwill in a divorce context. The only issue in Brooks
was how the goodwill in a family machine and tooling business should be val-
ued upon dissolution of marriage.90 The Brooks court held that the goodwill
was marital property and that the capitalization of excess earnings method
was a proper valuation method. 91
The expert who valued the goodwill of the business involved in Brooks
used the capitalization of excess earnings method. 92 The court correctly noted
that the method "appears to be a method approved by accountants and ac-
cepted, for the most part, by the courts." 93 In explaining its interpretation of
Hanson, the court said:
[W]e consider that in Hanson v. Hanson . . .our Supreme Court held
that the goodwill of a commercial or professional corporation is an intangible
asset susceptible of division under the provisions of § 452.330, if it may prop-
erly be classified as marital property within the intent of § 452.330.2; that
Hanson also held the goodwill of a professional corporation is peculiar to or-
ganizations of that order, and its value should be determined by ascertaining
the price the professional practice would bring were it sold on the open, rele-
vant market to a qualified professional. We do not understand that our Su-
preme Court necessarily rejected all other methods of valuing goodwill if the
corporation or other business entity is a commercial business enterprise.9
This interpretation gives rise to the hope that Missouri courts are on the right
track with respect to valuing commercial goodwill in the dissolution context
and will not in the future resort to the superficial analysis of the Hanson court
as to professional goodwill. Unfortunately, the Brooks court did not attempt to
explain why accounting formulas are appropriate when dealing with commer-
cial goodwill but not when dealing with professional goodwill. 5 This is a ques-
tion on which the supreme court should eventually rule and, if the difference
remains, explain itself.
88. Id. at 390.
89. 742 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 590. In actuality, the only relevance which Brooks has to this Note is
its interpretation of Hanson and, in contrast to the Hanson opinion, its sensible treat-
ment of accounting methods to value the asset of goodwill.
92. Id. at 589.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 590.
95. Perhaps this is because there is no sound reason for the differentiation.
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In Hanson, the Missouri Supreme Court had another chance to deal with
important issues relating to disposition of property at marriage dissolution.
While the court more forcefully and willingly decided the questions presented
to it,98 its opinion nevertheless deprives parties the chance to prove adequately
the value of professional goodwill. The court's imprecise analysis and holding
effectively will reduce such cases to a confrontation between expert witnesses.
The Missouri practitioner's central objective in dissolution actions involving
professionals after Hanson may be to package his expert's testimony in the
slickest package possible.
THOMAS M. HARRISON
96. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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